This Article examines the framework for resolving Title VII retaliation disputes through the lens of gender pay disparity and proposes that the current framework is inadequate. The Article begins by illustrating the issue and the impact of retaliatory conduct in the workplace through the stories of two female workers. It also explains the Title VII retaliation standard and explores the process for filing and pursuing an anti-retaliation claim under this framework.
Ultimately, the current framework is inadequate for two reasons. First, it does little to discourage retaliatory conduct by employers or co-workers because what amounts to “retaliation” under the law is under-inclusive and difficult to prove. Second, the employment relationship is among the most important in American society, but instead of seeking to salvage it, the current litigation-driven anti-retaliation framework destroys it. Consequently, the Article proposes an alternative dispute resolution method for solving retaliation disputes and provides examples from the transformative mediation and ombudsman models.
Discourse around reproductive and contraceptive technology in the United States is typically organized around ideas of autonomy, privacy, and free choice. The dichotomy of “pro-choice” and “pro-life” structures all debates on the topic, and the political framework of neoliberalism channels discussion into prepackaged frameworks of cost-benefit analysis and the primacy of free market choice. However, an examination of history and present policy developments paints a different picture. This Note argues that access to and regulation around contraception, abortion, and overall reproductive health and technology has been informed by and continues to interact with ideas of biopower and both positive and negative eugenics, and that neoliberal conceptions of free reproductive choice ignore the implications of this connection.
Part II traces the history of the eugenics movement in America, exemplified by forced and coerced sterilization of people considered mentally or physically “degenerate,” particularly those confined to institutions, and explores the rhetoric in early contraceptive-focused treatises and court decisions that reflect eugenicist views. Part III analyzes the modern trends on legal access to and regulation of reproductive and contraceptive technology and its interaction with race, socioeconomic status, and, in particular, disability (one of the more anxiety-producing categories of humanity in the neoliberal era). In Part IV, the Note goes on to argue that construction of a rational and compassionate legal framework where a woman’s right to choose is preserved (or revived) and the humanity of disabled persons is also respected is not only possible, but essential.
A truly feminist reproductive framework must be built on justice, not market choice, and must respect both the agency and autonomy of pregnant women and the humanity and individual subjectivity of disabled persons. Policy strategies towards this end will not be easy, but attention to all the intersectional and overlapping factors that affect women’s reproductive decision-making, especially with regard to disability and reproductive technology, can change the way we view and value disabled personhood in our society.